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Abstract 
Demand amplification (or “bullwhip” as it is now called) is not a new phenomenon, since 
evidence of its existence has been recorded at least as far back as the start of the twentieth 
century and is well known to economists.  Yet industry worldwide still has to cope with 
bullwhip measured not just in terms of the 2:1 amplification which is frequently quoted, but 
sometimes it is as high as 20:1 from end-to-end in the supply chain.  This can be very costly in 
terms of capacity on-costs and stock-out costs on the upswing and stockholding and 
obsolescence costs on the downswing.  In this paper we have identified 10 published causes of 
bullwhip, all of which are capable of elimination by re-engineering the supply chain.  We offer 
evidence on the present “health” of a family of supply chains, and pinpoint much good 
practice.  This is in anticipation that such excellence will become normative in the near future 
as the learning experience gathers momentum and provided that human factors are properly 
addressed.   
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1.  Introduction 
Jay Forrester (1958) has been rightly viewed in many quarters as a pioneer of modern day 
supply chain management.  His seminal work on demand amplification as studied via Systems 
Dynamics simulation demonstrated phenomena which many practising managers had 
experienced.  This included such events as demand waveforms being propagated upstream in 
the supply chain, the inducing of “rogue seasonality” in the order patterns and the consequent 
wrong-footing of decision makers.  Such demand amplification as shown in Figure 1 (Fisher, 
1997) is not new phenomena, since evidence of its existence has been recorded at least as far 
back as the start of the twentieth century.  The situation facing much of industry worldwide is 
exacerbated because “bullwhip”, Lee et al (1997), tends to be either misunderstood, or ignored 
(McCullen and Towill (2002).  Familiar arguments include that such “whiplash” behaviour 
(Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) is someone else’s problem, or it does not cost anything to this 
particular “player”, or it is an unavoidable fact of life.  But industry, in the meantime, has to 
cope with bullwhip measured not just in terms of the frequently quoted 2:1 amplification which 
is bad enough, but 20:1 and even higher (Holmström, 1997).  This behaviour can be very costly 
in terms of capacity on-costs and in stock-out costs (Metters, 1997).  Equally, because there are 
consequential downturns in demand stock-holding and obsolescence costs will also increase.  
If effective supply chain management is now seen as a move towards “Swift and Even Material 
Flow” (Schmenner, 2001), then another major contributor to our present day understanding of 
bullwhip is Jack Burbidge, who during his lifetime was in turn an experienced production 
manager, consultant, and then a distinguished academic.  Even prior to the “Japanisation” of 
much of US and European industry via the “Lean Thinking” Paradigm, he was arguing against 
the Economic Batch Quantity concept and in favour of the “Batch of One” supply (Burbidge, 
1981).  Hence, if we traditionally manufacture in large batches then his solution to queuing 
problems was to reduce these long set-up times, and aim for small batches as a way of life.  So 
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much so that even 40 years ago he was postulating “only to make in a week what you can use 
in a week”.  In the present operating environment we would simply substitute “day, or even 
hour”, for “week”, and his “5 Rules for Avoiding Bankruptcy” would thus have an amazing 
relevance to modern pipeline controls.  Historically the bullwhip problem has also been of 
considerable interest to economists via their study of trade cycles (Mitchell, 1923).  In this 
context the little-known paper by Zymelman (1965) provided an interesting proposal to reduce 
bullwhip in the cotton industry via a control law he established via analogue simulation.  
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 Figure 1. Who Bears the On-Costs?  Example of Bullwhip Generated via Price Promotion  
(Source: Fisher et al, 1997) 
Fortunately the writings of both Forrester and Burbidge considered a range of possible 
solutions to the bullwhip problem.  These may have been brought together to form a coherent 
set of streamlined Material Flow Principles which have been termed the FORRIDGE approach. 
These have been shown to produce substantial industrial benefits, via studies of BPR 
Programmes.  This improvement has been recorded despite the many barriers to change which 
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may be encountered as the historically entrenched “functional silos” react to the holistic 
approach.  More recently in a move to further improve on the FORRIDGE Principles bullwhip 
has become a topic for concurrent formal study.  This has brought together a number of 
previously separate strands of research, namely OR (Lee et al, 1997), control theory (Disney 
and Towill, 2002) and filter theory (Dejonckheere et al, 2002).  These topics underpin the 
essentially empirical studies of bullwhip via simulation (Forrester, 1958 and van Ackere et al, 
1993).   
 
In this paper we shall demonstrate that these approaches can be brought together via simulation 
packages as their focal point, thus providing diagnostic tools and design guidelines which will 
assist supply chain designers.  The methodology has been validated on industrial data which is 
representative of present day operations.  But, because the framework is based on sound 
theoretical principles it can also be exploited to test the new supply configurations needed to 
underpin the era of mass customisation.  In addition to our historical review, and illustrations 
from present industrial practice, we shall contemplate the future bullwhip scenario.  This will 
involve assessing a wide range of impacting factors, and is far from being an IT issue alone.  
Our perceptions are based on over two decades spent by the current authors as analyst, 
synthesist, modeller, observer, auditor, change manager and implementer roles in real-world 
value streams.  As output from this combined experience we posit that bullwhip is merely one 
phenomenon (amongst many) associated with poor material flow.  Furthermore our actions are 
based on identification and eradication of root causes. 
 
2.  Historical Review of Supply Chain “Best Practice” 
A brief history of supply chain “best practice” is summarised in Table 1 (Towill et al, 2002).  
The example of the design and construction of the Crystal Palace is noteworthy for the very 
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short total cycle time from conception to completion.  This was partly due to the modular iron-
and-glass design which greatly simplified erection on site.  However the then relatively recent 
arrival of the Birmingham to London railway also meant that the component parts could be 
delivered directly to the site Just-In-Time, (Wilkinson, 2000).  The Crystal Palace was built as 
a home to a huge exhibition of art and industry.  But the Victorians recognised it as something 
extraordinary.  As Wilkinson (2000) concludes, it was a magnificent logistics exemplar as was 
visibly apparent during the erection process and which was itself regarded as a spectacle to 
behold ahead of final commissioning.  
The quoted review of the early use of “Japanese” methods of Value Stream Management 
(VSM) (and keirutsu) and their “invention” in the USA is due to Drucker (1995).  Thus 
according to this source VSM was developed circa 1914 and practiced at GM for a period of 
some 40 years until US trade union opposition put an end to this approach.  However during 
this period VSM practice expanded into the retail sector, most notably in Sears Roebuck (in the 
USA) and Marks and Spencer (in the UK).  Significant progress was also made during this 
time on exploiting the principles of “Lean Production” in the manufacture of Spitfires during 
World War II (Burbidge, 1995), only to be discarded when peacetime resumed to his obvious 
chagrin.  Meanwhile in Japan the Toyota material flow control system was in place by around 
1970.  Some progress was made in transferring their approach to Western companies, a process 
accelerated by Schonberger (1982).  The final proof for the success of lean production applied 
in the right way at the right time was given by Womack et al. (1990).  The impact of their book 
is due to the lessons learned being transmitted via especially simple metrics; significant 
differences recorded according to these metrics; and finally the metrics selected being 
unambiguous and hence readily transferable between countries (Towill, 1999). 
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1851 
 
1916 
 
 
1919 
 
 
1925 
 
1940 
 
1946 
 
 
 
1955 
 
1961 
 
 
1970 
 
 
1980 
 
 
1982 
 
 
1990 
 
 
Mid 
1990s 
 
2000 
 
JIT effectiveness demonstrated in construction of the Crystal Palace, London 
 
Value stream management (and Keirutsu) invented in USA by William Durant of 
GM 
 
Successful action taken by Proctor and Gamble (USA) to damp down bullwhip in 
their supply chains. 
 
Value stream management concepts exploited in the retail sector by Sears Roebuck 
 
Parts of UK WWII fighter aircraft industry implements “lean production” and 
hence smoothes material flow. 
 
UK heaves a sigh of relief, abandons lean production and reverts to “comfort 
levels” of stock throughout the chain 
 
Value steam management hits the GM rocks of “unionisation” 
 
Smooth material flow logic published by Jack Burbidge as “The New Approach to 
Production” 
 
Toyoto exploit smooth material flow control principles via the “Understand 
Document Simplify and Optimise” concept of Edwards Deming 
 
Some Western firms follow suit, impressive results are achieved, but in many cases 
regression follows progression 
 
Richard Schonberger published “Japanese Manufacturing Techniques: Nine Hidden 
Lessons in Simplicity” 
 
The Machine That Changed The World unambiguously benchmarks performance 
improvement obtained by adopting smooth material flow control principles. 
 
Estimated that only 7% (Joseph Andraski, US retail) to 10% (Jack Burbidge, UK 
Manufacturing) of supply chains are effective. 
 
Audit of European automotive value streams shows just 10% are World Class 
“Exemplars” 
 
Table 1. Some Notable Events in the “Boom-and-Bust” Development of Smooth Material 
Flow 
 
However, it is also noted in Table 1 that despite the foregoing examples of good practice of 
good material flow control, that there are still many value streams which do not perform as 
well as they should.  Nor has the situation necessarily been any better in the past when, 
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arguably, operating scenarios were somewhat simpler.  For example here is an excellent 
description of an example of bullwhip and its promulgation. 
 
“Retailers find that there is a shortage of merchandise at their sources of supply.  
Manufacturers inform them that it is with regret that they are able to fill their orders only 
to the extent of 80 per cent: there has been an unaccountable shortage of materials that 
has prevented them from producing to their full capacity.  They hope to be able to give 
full service next season, by which time, no doubt, these unexplainable conditions will 
have been remedied.  However, retailers, having been disappointed in deliveries and lost 
20 per cent or more of their possible profits thereby, are not going to be caught that way 
again.  During the season they have tried with little success to obtain supplies from other 
sources.  But next season, if they want 90 units of an article, they order 100, so as to be 
sure, each, of getting the 90 in the pro rata share delivered.  Probably they are 
disappointed a second time.  Hence they increase the margins of their orders over what 
they desire, in order that their pro rata shares shall be for each the full 100 per cent that 
he really wants.  Furthermore, to make doubly sure, each merchant spreads his orders 
over more sources of supply.”   (Mitchell, 1923) 
 
It may come as some surprise to many that this quotation is attributable to Mitchell (1923) and 
cited by Sterman (1986).  As a descriptor of the bullwhip effect it has a potential impact at least 
as great as that made by the classic description of the jeans clothing supply chain by Stalk and 
Hout (1990).  But not only was bullwhip historically known (but not defined), so were some 
little publicised proposed solutions.  For example, Zymelman (1965) tested a control law for 
damping down the aggregate cotton industry supply chain cycle based on proportional 
feedback of inventory error and WIP error.  His verification was via an analogue computer 
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simulation since at that time digital simulation was still in its infancy.  Even earlier, Metzler 
(1941) had provided an analytic solution to one particular inventory cycle problem which 
established stability boundaries according to his assumptions.  This latter paper is also 
noteworthy because of his criticism of researchers who draw generic conclusions (sometimes 
wrongly) from numerical solutions, which can subsequently be disproved via algebraic 
analysis.  We agree with this comment, but would emphasise that in supply chain design 
analytical tools have a limited (but admittedly very important) role to play e.g. Vendor 
Managed Inventory (VMI) systems are analytic under particular operating conditions (Disney 
and Towill, 2002).  Modern day software greatly assists obtaining such solutions via 
elimination of the need for tedious algebraic manipulation. 
 
3.  Bullwhip and the Economy 
Bullwhip (under any other name) has long been of interest to economists.  For example the 
foregoing description of the behaviour of the retail supply chain as described by Mitchell 
(1923) is remarkably similar to the classic clothing value stream described by Stalk and Hout 
(1990).  Since it is reckoned that problems in supply chains are “80% people centred and 20% 
technology centred” (Andraski, 1994) this is hardly surprising.  It is our experience that if 
supply chains can possibly find a way of inducing bullwhip, then they surely will, which is an 
alternative view of the Burbidge Law of Industrial Dynamics (Towill, 1997).  At the national 
economy level, bullwhip is frequently observed, reproduced in Table 2 (Blanchard, 1983).  
These results are for American automobile manufacturers at the OEM Divisional level.  This 
Table therefore aggregates the data for a number of current models some of whose individual 
bullwhip effects, according to the Central Limit Theorem, are likely to be much higher.  Also 
note that although Table 2 suggests bullwhip is present, further analysis leading to improved 
indictors as recently advocated by El-Beheiry et al (2004) may well be justified. 
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Car 
Manufacturing 
Division No. 
Production Deviation 
Sales Deviation 
Total Car Inventory 
Sales 
(in months) Raw Data Seasonal Remnant 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1.42 
1.43 
1.27 
1.38 
1.35 
1.42 
1.23 
1.34 
1.35 
1.43 
1.65 
1.76 
1.76 
1.63 
1.94 
1.38 
1.31 
1.96 
1.33 
1.47 
1.23 
1.29 
1.30 
1.30 
1.37 
1.37 
1.30 
1.22 
1.44 
1.53 
2.49 
2.10 
2.02 
2.04 
1.40 
2.38 
2.94 
3.04 
4.45 
4.08 
 
N.B.  The deviations given are the square root of the sum of the squares divided by (N-1) 
 
Table 2.  Historical Record of Bullwhip Recorded in the USA Automobile Industry 
(Source:  Blanchard, 1983) 
 
  
Figure 2. Periodicity in the Economy ~ an Example of a Kondratieff Wave 
(Source:  Kondratieff (1984) http://www.angelfire.com/or/truthfinder/index22.html) 
 
A major area of study in economics is concerned with bullwhip observed in the total economy.  
This is the phenomenon known as the “long wave” or the Kondratieff (1984) cycle.  An 
excellent summary from our perspective is given by Sterman (1986).  He says;  
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“The long wave is characterised by successive waves of overexpansion and collapse of 
the economy, particularly the capital-producing sector.  Overexpansion means an 
increase in the capacity to produce and in the production of plant, equipment, and 
goods relative to the amount needed to replace worn-out units and provide for growth 
over the long run.  Overexpansion is undesirable because, eventually, production and 
employment must be cut back to below normal levels  to reduce the excess. 
 
How does the long wave arise?  In particular, how does overexpansion of the capital-
producing sector of the economy arise?  The explanation can be divided into two parts.  
First, the internal structure and policies of individual firms tend to amplify changes in 
demand, creating the potential for oscillation in the adjustment of capacity to changes 
in the desired level.  Second, a wide range of self-reinforcing processes significantly 
amplifies the response of individual firms to changes in demand, increasing the 
amplitude and lengthening the period of the fluctuations generated by each firm.” 
 
Establishing the Systems Dynamics National Model provided a representation of the US 
economy via which the long wave phenomenon could be studied.  Sterman (1986) thereby 
produces two findings of particular interest to bullwhip analysts.  He argues that waves are 
produced in economic systems because there are; 
 
 Inherent oscillatory tendencies within firms.  Due to the inevitable lags in acquiring 
factors of production and reacting to changes in demand, firms tend to amplify 
unanticipated changes in demand, creating the potential for oscillation in the 
adjustment of production capacity to demand. 
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 Self-reinforcing processes between firms further amplify the volatility.  Though 
individual firms are likely to be stable, a wide range of positive feedback loops is 
created by the couplings of individual firms to one another, to the labour markets, 
and to the financial markets.  
 
Such mechanisms substantially amplify the fluctuations in the demand for capital created by 
individual firms, boosting the amplitude and lengthening the period of the inherent oscillatory 
tendencies of firms.  The major self-reinforcing processes involve capital self-ordering, labour 
market interactions and real interest rate dynamics.  A practical example of the impact of 
economic factors on the behaviour of the machine tool supply chain is given by Anderson et al, 
(2000).  There is extreme volatility therein caused by the “multiplier effect” which in this case 
is the high gearing (say 10 to 1) of changes in percentage annual replacement of the capacity of 
the customer (product manufacturer) on the number of orders placed on the machine tool 
suppliers.  Hence if due to an economic downturn the product manufacturer decides to reduce 
his capacity by 10%, this could mean zero orders placed.  But if later he decided to compensate 
and increase his capacity by 10%, then this would double the number of orders passing up 
stream to the machine tool producers. 
 
4.  Clearing Up the “Mess” 
In the language of Russell Ackoff (1999) a supply chain exhibiting bullwhip is a “mess” in the 
sense that the problem to be solved must be abstracted from that situation in order that a 
solution be proposed.  The final outcome, following the Understand-Document-Simplify-
Optimise (UDSO) routine proposed by Watson (1994) should be a more effective supply chain 
exhibiting a greatly reduced bullwhip in the real-world.  An example of the complete procedure 
is that describing the Business Process Re-Engineering of a real-world global mechanical 
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precision products supply chain (Towill and McCullen, 1999).  At the conclusion of the 
Glosuch Rapid Response Programme the bullwhip as measured over a sample product range 
had been reduced by 50%.  Furthermore the stock turns had concurrently increased by 2 to 1 
and were on track to ultimately reach 4 to 1.  As expected, customer service levels 
simultaneously improved dramatically with the standard deviation of delivery variation 
reduced by 70%.  However the Glosuch learning curve dynamics are of particular interest here 
since month-on-month improvements were still occurring some two years after BPR 
completion. 
 
These results are typical of the benefits accruing from supply chain re-design and properly 
engineered implementation.  It is important to emphasise that just reducing bullwhip is not the 
only positive impact since many other performance metrics are thereby simultaneously 
improved.  In terms of bullwhip induced production on-costs at the factory gate, these are 
estimated by Metters (1997) to attract a penalty of between 20% and 50%.  Since these 
estimates are for a production schedule which is optimum for the order pattern as received, and 
the factory is unlikely to perform so well, these estimates are to be regarded as conservative.  
Note also that the estimates cover only those costs incurred by the factory.  The resulting on-
costs between the factory and the marketplace are additional and for such cases as those shown 
in Figure 1 are quite substantial. 
 
Miragliotta (2004) has examined the bullwhip phenomenon with the intention of producing a 
classification system which identifies “amplifiers” and “triggers”.  This is based on a control 
theoretic approach in analogy with systems theory.  Our view is that bullwhip reduction is best 
enabled via implementation of the principles of smooth material flow.  So the intention in a 
practical BPR Programme is to identify and eliminate all causes of poor material flow and 
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eliminate them ~ to good effect, as demonstrated in the real-world Glosuch supply chain 
(Towill and McCullen, 1999).  The Miragliotta (2004) framework may well have a practical 
use in providing a “layered” framework for the design of BPR programmes to reduce bullwhip.  
What we can say is that in practice, businesses tend to first put their own house in order then 
use this expertise to bring suppliers into the system: exploit this “best practice” working with 
our customers: and improve control during each phase according to the current modus operandi 
(Towill et al, 2002). 
 
5.  Five Routes to Bullwhip Knowledge 
Assuming that a real-world “mess” has been identified as a bullwhip problem, how has our 
knowledge of potential solutions been acquired?  Five routes are shown in Fig. 3, together with 
sample supporting references.  These routes are mutually supportive, and indeed some 
references qualify under more than one heading eg Sterman (1989).  This is hardly surprising, 
since in the analytic routes the mathematics may well be similar, even if the insight offered by 
the particular methodologies is different depending on the “eye of the beholder”.  Broadly 
speaking the five routes may be summarised as follows; 
OR Theory.  The problem is expressed as a difference equation, with some parameters 
variable.  The solution sought is one that explicitly minimises a cost function (or a 
surrogate), for an assumed set of operating conditions (Deziel and Eilon, 1967).  The 
dynamic performance is implied by the mathematical solution to the problem. 
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Figure 3. Five Routes to Bullwhip Reduction ~ from Real-World Problem to Real-World 
Solution 
(Source: Authors) 
 
Key 
(A)  Ackoff (1999)   (B)  Schmenner (2001)  
(C)  Zymelman (1965)  (D)  Lee and Billington (1992)  
(E)  Holmström (1997)  (F)  Lambrecht and Dejonckheere (1999) 
(G)  Sterman (1989)   (H)  Forrester (1958) 
(I)   van Ackere et al, (1993)  (J)   Vassian (1955) 
(K)  Deziel and Eilon (1967)  (L)  Riddalls and Bennett (2002) 
(M)  Axsäter (1985)   (N)  Towill and del Vecchio (1994) 
(O)  Burns and Sivazlian (1978) (P)   Adelson (1996) 
(Q)  Towill et al (2002)  (R)  Chen et al, (2000) 
(S)   Lee et al, (1997)   (T)  Thonemann (2002) 
(U)  Holt et al, (1960)   (V)  McCullen and Towill (2002) 
 
 
Filter Theory.  The problem is expressed in the frequency domain where value 
judgements are made on spectrum widths of the “message” and the “noise”, or 
“disturbances”.  Using an assumed control law the solution is obtained by shaping the 
system frequency response to suit the needs of the user (Towill and del Vecchio, 1994).  
The dynamic performance is explicit from inspecting this response, whereas the cost 
performance is implicit. 
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Control Theory.  The problem is expressed in transfer function form and concentrates 
on system structure, initially to guarantee stability, and then to shape the desired 
response.  A substantial data base of possible supply chain structures is available, 
especially from hardware system analogues (‘Towill, 1982).  The dynamic response is 
explicit from studying “rich pictures” obtained via solution of the difference equations 
for test demands. 
 
“What If” Simulation.  System dynamics type modelling where causal loop diagrams 
are transformed into simulation models and studied via test demands arbitrary.  There is 
a large data base of such models available (Lyneiss, 1980).  For the design eventually 
selected via this “what if” procedure the dynamic response will be explicit. 
 
Ad-Hocacy.  This is included because as we have seen by reference to Mitchell (1923), 
or indeed Devons (1950) and Sterman (1989) it is possible for experienced managers or 
observers to get a good feel for what is causing poor behaviour within the real-world 
“mess”.  Hence practical experience in observing amplification caused by an echelon, 
subsequent action to re-engineer the chain to remove the echelon, and assessing the 
subsequent improvement certainly adds to the bullwhip knowledge base.  Such an 
approach is conjectural with regard to the dynamic response. 
 
We now proceed to examine the “ground rules” that have accumulated over the years via these 
five routes.  It will provide a reasonable summary of “where we are now” regarding bullwhip 
in supply chains.  As we have already stipulated earlier these routes are not mutually exclusive.  
For example Deziel and Eilon (1967) and Adelson (1966) are all OR specialists.  Yet the 
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former paper has discernable elements of control theory therein, and the latter paper points 
towards filter theory. 
 
6.  What We Now Know About Bullwhip Reduction ~ the Ten Principles 
At this stage we must again emphasise that the twin pioneers of “modern” supply chain 
knowledge are Jay Forrester and Jack Burbidge.  They “opened up” the subject, laid bare many 
of the problems, and showed the way to possible solutions.  Many of the researchers cited in 
this paper owe both Forrester and Burbidge a great debt since they generated the following four 
supply chain design principles; 
 
 Control System Principle.  There is a need to select the most appropriate control 
system best suited to achieving user targets.  In turn this will necessitate accessing 
important supply chain “states” thus taking unnecessary guesswork out of the 
system. 
 Time Compression Principle.  Every activity in the chain should be undertaken in 
the minimum time needed to achieve task goals.  In practice this means removing 
non-value added time or “muda” from the system.  It also means delivering on time 
what is actually required i.e. this Principle covers process capability. 
 Information Transparency Principle.  Up-to-the minute data free of “noise” and 
“bias” should be accessed by all “players” in the system.  This simultaneously 
removes information delays and “double-guessing” other “players”.  Because 
inventories, WIP, flow rates, and orders are now visible throughout the chain, 
holistic control via a suitable DSS is now enabled. 
 Echelon Elimination Principle.  There should be the minimum number of echelons 
appropriate to the goals of the supply chain.  The aim is to have not only the 
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optimum level of inventories (maybe in some instances actually zero) but to have 
these minimum stocks in the right place at the right time.  
 
There is a fifth Principle which was implied by Forrester but proven (by example) by 
Burbidge.  This is the  
 
 Synchronisation Principle.  In Forrester simulations all events are synchronised so 
that orders and deliveries are visible at discrete points in time.  Burbidge showed by 
reference to multiple customers working on EBQ re-order principles that this 
produced an emphatic bullwhip effect subsequently eliminated by continuous 
ordering synchronised throughout the chain. 
 
Additionally as demonstrated by Wikner et al (1992) there is a sixth Principle inherent in the 
original Forrester supply chain model.  This is very important as a source of bullwhip as 
demonstrated in the machine-tool industry (Anderson et al, 2000).  It is the 
 
 Multiplier Principle.  There can be situations where orders directly multiply in a 
knock-on effect, usually between product manufacturers and their capital equipment 
suppliers.  So if a product manufacturer replaced all its machine tools on a 10 year 
cycle, it might choose to increase planned capacity by 10% one year, leading to its 
machine tool orders being doubled, a “multiplier” of 10 to 1. 
 
There are four further principles emerging from extensions to the Forrester approach, as 
published by Lee et al (1997), and which have been shown by them to be significant bullwhip 
generators; 
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 Demand Forecast Principle.  Forecasts may well be a problem simply because they 
are so rarely right.  But attempts to improve the situation by building in safety 
factors and trend detection capability may result in bullwhip generation.  
Furthermore demand forecasts need to cope with such phenomenon as “product 
substitution” where what is actually available is sold in place of stock-out items. 
 Order Batching Principle.  Time phased aggregation of orders (the bane of the 
EBQ so deplored by Burbidge) lead to “lumpy” deliveries, and hence come back 
around the ordering loop as “lumpy” orders, which is a certain cause of bullwhip.  
 Price Fluctuation Principle.  Marketing programmes may deliberately be designed 
to empty over-full pipelines.  As Fisher (1997) has ably demonstrated, this effect 
may cause a backlash by over-ordering so as to take advantage of discounts on offer.  
When the retailer has enough stock, their orders drop to zero in a typical boom-and-
bust scenario. 
 Gaming Principle.  As Mitchell (1923) described in an actual (or perceived) 
shortage situation, there will be orders placed to “hedge” against unpredictable 
supply.  Both suppliers and customers may be involved in this game, followed by 
double-guessing of the form “X has ordered 1000, but I bet he only needs 400” 
followed by “Y is slow with his deliveries; I really need 500 but I’d better order 
1200 just in case”, and so on. 
 
As this review shows, BPR programme managers are not short on guidelines to follow when 
designing supply chains for improved performance.  In theory it seems quite straightforward to 
just apply UDSO (Understand ~ Document ~ Simplify and Optimise) according to the steps 
suggested by Watson (1994), and a better supply chain will automatically result.  This is the 
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theory; sometimes the practice is just a little different.  It may not be rocket science, but it is 
definitely rocket engineering in terms of the inputs required, especially during the analysis and 
design phases. 
 
7.  Bullwhip Clichés ~ Why the Problem Isn’t Tackled as Well as it Should Be 
There is much anecdotal evidence available on present day supply chain operations.  The 
attitude with respect to bullwhip varies widely according to the observer’s perception, their 
position within the supply chain, and the power associated with their particular function.  For 
example, McCullen and Towill (2002) list the following clichés: 
 Ignorance cliché  Bullwhip? Doesn’t exist in the real world 
 Arrogance cliché  Bullwhip? Is just an academic invention 
 Negligence cliché  Bullwhip? Doesn’t cost me any money  
 Indifference cliché  Bullwhip? The customer can wait 
 Transference cliché Bullwhip? So what? – the suppliers can cope.  That’s what                      
    service level agreements are for! 
 Acceptance cliché  Bullwhip? It’s like tax – always with us 
 Despondence cliché Bullwhip? It’s a systems problem – nothing I can do about it 
 Decadence cliché  Bullwhip? It’s old hat – surely it’s been eradicated by now? 
 Intolerance cliché  Bullwhip? Japanese solutions don’t work here 
 Avoidance Cliché  Bullwhip? Those solutions are all very well – but not in my                     
    industry 
All of these attitudes have been met experientially in real-world scenarios by McCullen and 
Towill (2002).  These comments cover a wide range of sentiment.  This is not unexpected 
given the earlier comment by Andraski (1994) that supply chain problems are “80% people and 
20% technology” in origin.  So the “actors” making the foregoing remarks are just going 
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through normal routines of “turf protection” and “buck passing”.  In the meantime, as the 
Campbell’s Soup example, coupled with the Metters (1997) cost model, show, the ramp-up/ 
ramp-down production on-costs, and stock-holding/stock-out costs add significantly to the 
price paid by the customer.  Nor are these added costs spread equitably throughout the chain.  
Since the classic Marshall Fisher paper was published in 1997, the influence of the retailer has 
increased yet further.  So their “mark-ups” tend to have risen significantly with the on-costs 
being disproportionately borne upstream.  As Levy (1995) has shown, this situation may be 
worsened, not bettered, when adopting third world outsourcing.  
 
8.  Present Operational Status of Supply Chains 
Our contention is that supply chains designed to be seamless in operation should seek to avoid 
these on-costs arising in the first place.  So to provide more scientific evidence on the 
operational status of real-world supply chains, an investigation was undertaken into the 
behaviour of 32 trans-European value streams, mostly from the automotive market sector.  The 
successful launch of the so-called “Lean Production” description of Japanese practice by 
Womack et al (1990) led us to expect that many of these value streams would score well in this 
exercise.  The investigation required extensive field work as described by Naim et al (2002).  It 
was based on the concept of assessing the extent of smooth material flow (arguably the inverse 
of bullwhip).  For consistency the comparison between value streams was made on the basis of 
perceived uncertainty against the observed occurrence of particular phenomena.  These were 
monitored via the physical situation in the plant(s), operational features, organisational 
features, and dynamic behaviour perceived from numerical data. 
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To obtain a single index of performance the codified audit output was based on Likert scale 
ratings of the uncertainty levels in the value streams.  Four individual scores were estimated for 
each value stream according to the perceived uncertainty arising from the following sources: 
 
 Process uncertainty.  Process uncertainty affects an organisation’s internal ability 
to meet a production delivery target. 
 Supply uncertainty.  Supply uncertainty results from poorly performing suppliers’ 
not meeting an organisation’s requirements and thereby handicapping value-added 
processes. 
 Demand uncertainty.  Demand uncertainty can be thought of as the difference 
between the actual end-marketplace demand and the orders placed within an 
organisation by its customers.  
 Control uncertainty.  Control uncertainty is associated with information flow and 
the way an organisation actually transforms customer orders into production targets 
and supplier raw materials 
 
The single index of performance is then calculated as the Euclidean Norm of these four 
individual uncertainty scores.  The sample may then be ranked according to this score which 
has a theoretical range from the “traditional” (functional silo) supply change right through to 
internal and external seamless operation.  The stages of the Stevens (1989) Supply Chain 
Model are then used as “Benchmarks” against the degree of integration achieved by the 
sampled value streams. 
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Fig. 4. Present Practice ~ Supply Chain Audit Results Based on Uncertainty Scores 
(Source: Childerhouse, 2002) 
 
9.  Value Stream Audit Results 
The result of the audit is shown in Fig. 4.  The pie chart classifies the supply chain value 
streams according to their uncertainty scores.  About 10 percent of the value streams studied 
demonstrated minimal control over their own processes and had not successfully applied 
material flow and lean thinking concepts even to their operations.  Another 45 percent still had 
major uncertainties.  They were in various stages of implementing lean thinking concepts but 
had already reduced some of the uncertainty in their value stream.  Approximately 35 percent 
had reduced their uncertainty levels even further and were already engaged in supply chain 
practices that went significantly beyond internal integration as defined by the Stevens (1989) 
model.  Finally, 10 percent of the organisations in the audit can be regarded as rapidly 
approaching the seamless supply chain.  They can be regarded with confidence as exemplars of 
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world-class performers.  So we may surmise that nearly half the sample exhibit some good 
practice worth emulating and furthermore the top 10 percent are identified as worthy 
benchmarks to exploit in identifying “best practice”.  In other words any volatility experienced 
by the company was due to the marketplace behaviour and not to the value stream dynamics. 
 
PERFORMANCE 
METRIC 
OBSERVED BENEFIT 
Lead Time 
Set-up Time 
Production Runs/Annum 
Rejects/Million Parts 
Overdue Orders 
Annual Sales 
Return on Investment 
Down 
Down 
Up 
Down 
Down 
Up 
Up 
7 to 1 
3 to 1 
4 to 1 
2.5 to 1 
4 to 1 
by 1/3 
by 1/3 
 
Table 3. Typical Performance Improvements Obtained Via Smooth Material Flow  
(Source:  Burbidge and Halsall, 1994) 
 
That BPR based on such streamlined material flow is effective can be seen from Table 3 which 
shows the bottom line improvement for a first-tier automotive supplier to both OEM and 
Autospares customers (Burbidge and Halsall, 1994).  A detailed Case Study also shows that 
such BPR Programmes can substantially reduce bullwhip (typically by 50 percent with 
associated increase in stock-turns from two to four-to-one) as happened in a real-world 
mechanical precision products global supply chain (McCullen and Towill, 2002).  As the value 
stream moves closer to the goal of the seamless supply chain, it becomes more in tune with 
both its customers and the marketplace, providing competitive advantages to participants 
across the entire chain.   
 
This heightened proximity to the customer reinforces the movement toward integration beyond 
our functional walls and much better visibility across the extended supply chain.  This 
increased integration, in turn, leads to lowered uncertainty and improved performance.  Thus, 
the seamless supply chain becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy i.e. a virtuous circle.  Hence 
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lower uncertainty leads to tighter integration, which reduces uncertainty further, and the cycle 
continues, resulting in smooth material flow and minimal bullwhip.  As Wikner et al (1992) 
demonstrated, what a “player” within the chain needs to know is how his customer orders are 
constituted.  Specifically, knowledge of the “firm orders from the marketplace” plus “buffer 
store top-ups” plus “forecast future demand” is what is wanted to make an appropriate 
scheduling decision.  
 
10.  How Does Bad Performance Actually Happen? 
The Pie Chart ranking of the 32 value stream sample shown in Fig. 3 raises the issue as to how 
some real-world chains are still operating so poorly in the light of our vast current knowledge 
of supply chain design as outlined in Section 5.  To answer this important question the Quick 
Scan Audits (Naim et al, 2002) also identified a range of typical problems encountered within 
the value stream sample.  These are listed in Table 4 and classified under the “Process Side”: 
“Supply Side”; Demand Side”, and “Control Side” regimen.  We have also indicated the 
supply chain disruption potential associated with each observed weakness.  Our surprise 
comment concerning Table 4 is not that these problems run counter to present day knowledge 
of what is required of good supply chain practice (which is bad enough), but that some of these 
factors can be traced to aircraft production in World War II (Devons, 1950), and even as far 
back as the retail sector scenario cited by Mitchell (1923).  We think a major contributor to 
such intransigence is the “people problem” as identified previously by Andraski (1994).  
 
It is customary to take the optimistic view and think of the human contribution within supply 
chains to be participating effectively, such as the Production Scheduler in an automotive value 
stream taking in data from many sources and DSS’s and improving on the decision making 
process by his ability to take an intelligent overview of the current operating scenario (Olsmats 
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et al, 1988).  This is unfortunately an altruistic perspective and the “people factor” really is still 
a critical issue in changing business processes.  For example Loughman et al, (2000) listed the 
following “people factors” to be properly addressed, otherwise the planned improvements will 
simply not happen: 
 
 
 
Uncertainty 
Source 
 
 
 
Some Observed Weaknesses 
 
Supply Chain 
Disruption Potential 
Da
ta 
Ma
ski
n g 
Da
ta 
Sh
ort
fal
l 
Da
ta 
Er
ror
s 
Ex
ces
s 
De
la y
s 
Ex
ces
s 
Va
ria
nce
s 
Process 
Side 
 No measures of process performance       Reactive rather than proactive maintenance      Random shop floor layout      Interference between value streams     
Supply 
Side 
 Short notification of changes to supplier 
requirements      Excessive supplier delivery lead time       Adversarial supplier relationships       No vendor MOPS      
Demand 
Side 
 No customer stock visibility       Adversarial customer relationship       Large infrequent deliveries to customer       Continuous product modifications causing high 
levels of obsolescence     
Control 
Side 
 Poor stock auditing       No synchronisation and poor visibility during sub-
control      Incorrect supplier lead times in MRP logic       Infrequent MRP runs      
 
Table 4. Typical Problems Observed in Real-World Supply Chains 
(Source:  Geary et al, 2002) 
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 People do not always use “rational” methods to make decisions 
 People have their personal agenda and hence view their world metaphorically and 
symbolically as well as literally 
 People will not always do what they are told to do, or even what they know they 
should do 
 People can be very creative in sabotaging structures and processes they fear or 
dislike 
 The organisational chart inadequately describes how members actually conduct 
their business 
 
Sometimes their decisions may be made with the best of intentions as viewed from their 
narrow parochial perspective.  An example is the “Hockey Stick Effect”.  Typically a company 
will attempt to improve its financial reporting figures by manipulating the supply chain.  For 
example, towards the end of the financial year or quarter, it may offer discounts to customers 
so as to boost the order book.   This may also include shipping products to customers that they 
did not even want so as to reduce our inventory and boost sales in our final financial report.  
The opposite strategy also applies, when failing to order products from suppliers near 
milestone dates in order to reduce the stock count and hence holding costs even if it is clear 
that such items will be needed soon by the next downstream value-added process.  
Consequently the latter experiences under-supply during the next period.    
 
There is also another related effect caused by the financial reporting mechanism.  Over time 
the stock position in a computer system may well deviate from the actual stock position.  It is 
well known that even major retailers find it difficult to keep track of where goods are actually 
located within any given store.  So what is logged as available stock may not actually be on the 
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rails for the customer to see (Raman et al, 2001).  When the auditors come in and make a 
physical stock count, they find these errors and they are then rectified but appear as an impulse 
in the ordering system, thus starting a bullwhip wave which can be compounded via the 
particular forecasting algorithm used.  Hence the importance of educating value stream 
“players” on the often unintended consequences of their actions, a point readily demonstrated 
by playing the MIT Beer Game (Senge, 1993) in interactive mode with participants selected 
from various echelons within the chain. 
 
11.  Supply Chains of the Future 
Our sample analysis of 32 value streams has thrown up an apparent elite which may be 
regarded as exemplars.  If these are to become the “norm” for future supply chain design and 
operations it is essential that the lessons to be learnt from these exemplars are readily 
transferable within and between market sectors.  This is the litmus test for deciding if a real  
contribution to management theory has been made (Micklethwait and Woolridge, 1996).  
Hence Table 5 shows the good practice mined from these exemplars.  These are grouped into 
simplified material flow properties, supply chain relationships, and the over-arching 
information systems.  In our view all three are key factors in enabling good supply chain 
practice.  The output of interest herein is the schedule stability, as defined by Harrison (1997), 
since this is a direct measure of the bullwhip experienced by the supplier.  It is also a surrogate 
indicator for estimating the likelihood of bullwhip at that level in the chain. 
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Observed Area of 
Good Practice 
 
  
Exemplar Value Stream Characteristics 
 
 
Simplified 
Material Flow 
  Customer orientated operations  Single piece material flow in place  Pull systems based on Kanbans  Use of the shortest possible planning 
period   Active process time compression 
 
Supply Chain 
Relationships 
  Generic partnerships with key suppliers  Dominant ‘player’ i.e. “product 
champion” who manages the 
synchronisation and co-ordination of the 
supply chain   Single point of control 
Information 
System 
   Totally integrated information systems 
 
Schedule Stability   Average schedule variability of the three 
exemplars is 4% over a one-month 
forecast, compared to 45% for the entire 
32 value stream sample. 
 
Table 5. Supply Chain “Best Practices” Identified Via Audit of European Value Streams 
(Source: Childerhouse, 2002) 
 
Using the schedule stability metric, we see that our three exemplars are over 10:1 better than 
for the sample average.  This has been enabled via good business systems engineering 
techniques to re-engineer material flow and information flow.  By entering into appropriate 
supply chain relationships this infrastructure is exploited on behalf of all “players” in the chain.  
The single point-of-control ensures that a holistic system results from this opportunity.  The 
impact is then maximised by the presence of the totally integrated information systems which 
ensures the data required is actually available in a timely, noise free, bias free fashion.  Such a 
seamless supply chain (SSC) minimises the possibility of generating bullwhip via our value 
added processes, via our supply processes, and via our control processes.  In a similar fashion 
the demand volatility is reduced to the bare essentials because we have marketplace 
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transparency at all levels in the chain, thus avoiding the double-guessing and wrong-footing 
associated with traditional value streams. 
 
The requirements for good supply chain practice which, amongst other benefits, reduces 
unnecessary bullwhip, as shown in Table 5 may seem a modest target to aim at to ensure that 
the normative supply chain of the future is as good as the exemplar of today.  But as we have 
already seen, there is unfortunately a large step forward still to be taken.  This requires the 
willingness to properly exploit the existence of IT, rather than just pay lip service to its use.  
For example, in the critical area of timely, noise free, and bias free information flow, the large 
US company survey results shown in Table 6 remain disturbing.  Nor does the recent survey of 
128 Swedish companies present and expected future use of collaborative forecasting 
techniques make for an better reading (Olhager and Selldin, 2004).  The up-to-date status of 
inventory, capacity, order status, demand history, and forecasts (including the “essential system 
states” as in the language of Miraglotta, 2004) are pre-requisites to seamless supply chain 
operations.  These survey results suggest that trust still has to emerge in many value stream 
relationships, the inhibition being the persistence with traditional “adversarial win-lose 
negotiations” (Clark and Hammond, 1997).  Until this situation is resolved into true 
partnerships unnecessary bullwhip will continue to exist, multiply, and incur significant on-
costs. 
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Type of Data Made Available 
Surveyed 
In 1998 
Estimated for 
2001 
Inventory and Capacity  50% 
 
75% 
Demand History and Forecasts 30% 72% 
Order Status 30% 66% 
Project Design and Specifications 34% 54% 
Financial Information 3% 20% 
 
 
Table 6. Percentage of Large US Companies Making Specific Information Available  
to Business Partners 
(Results of Price Waterhouse Coopers 1999 Survey reported by Knolmayer et al, 2002) 
 
12. Conclusions 
Bullwhip has a long tradition for causing disruptions and massive over-swings and under-
swings in demand.  The former results in quite unnecessary ramping up of production (usually 
tried at great speed with the generation of corresponding inefficiencies), and the latter 
necessitates much pain via paid idle time and possible redundancies.  The on-costs incurred 
include “learning effects” for new labour on the upswing, and lay-off costs on the downswing.  
Because of this cyclical behaviour (well-known in economic circles as the boom-and-bust 
scenario), the stocks will also fluctuate out-of-phase with demand.  So again on the upswing, 
there will be stock-outs, whilst on the downswing there will be excess stock with a tendency to 
incur obsolescence and to damage during excessive storage periods.  So business is lost 
because the products are not available when required, and when they are available they are at a 
higher cost than need be.  
 
We have identified at least ten major causes of bullwhip.  These are in part due to problems in 
our value-added processes, supplier difficulties, demand volatility, and control processes.  A 
way forward is to re-engineer the supply chain to systematically remove all avoidable causes 
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of uncertainty.  This requires the effective application of business systems engineering 
principles involving technical, cultural, organisational, and financial aspects of the project.  It 
is our view that the underlying themes during the execution of such BPR programmes are 
smooth material flow, smooth and transparent information flow, time compression of all 
processes, holistic controls and the abolition of all interfaces, especially those causing 
functional silos to exist.  The consequence is a movement away from traditional, adversarial 
operations, towards the minimal bullwhip seamless supply chain scenario.  In practical terms 
there appears to be little difficulty in thereby reducing real-world bullwhip by at least 50%. 
 
Our perception of future bullwhip lies not in revolutionary new supply chains.  Instead we see 
the promulgation of the present established “exemplar” good practice which has demonstrated 
that our present knowledge of bullwhip causes can generate effective solutions to be matched 
to the particular needs of the individual value streams.  This move from a few exemplars to a 
future scenario where their present day exceptional standards have become the new norm needs 
to be accelerated.  But barring the path to such progress are a number of factors which lie 
outside the technical arena.  By far the greatest of these is the elimination of the “functional 
silo” mentality and its replacement by a new era of interface management.  Only then can we 
fully exploit the versatility of present day IT to improve supply chain competitiveness.  This 
includes avoiding bullwhip on-costs by using proven designs to ensure smooth material flow as 
needed to satisfy the true demands of the marketplace.  We heartily agree with a recent paper 
which argues that the first step must always be to implement the Time Compression Principle 
(de Treville et al, 2004) and hence reduce all lead times to their optimum value.  It is also 
axiomatic that these new reduced targets must be consistently achieved if uncertainty is to be 
reduced. 
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